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Abstract
Stifel and Alderman evaluate  the Vaso de Leche  (VL)  transfers  is attributed  to intradistrict  targeting.  But the
feeding program  in Peru.  They pose the question  that if a  impact of these  food subsidies beyond  their value as
community-based  multistage  targeting scheme  such as  income transfers  is limited by  the degree to which the
that of the VL  program is progressive,  is it possible that  commodity  transfers are inframiiarginal.  The authors find
the program can achileve  its nutritional  objectives?  The  that transfers  of milk and milk substitutes from the VL
authors  address this  by linking VL public expenditure  program are  inframarginal for approximately  half of the
data  with  hiousehold  survey data to assess the targeting,  households that receive  them. So, it is not entirely
and then  to model the determinants  of nutritionial  surprising that they  fail  to find econometric evidenice  of
outcomes  of children to see  if VL program  interventions  the nutritionial  objectives  of the VL program being
have  an  impact on  nutrition.  They confirm  that the VL  achieved.  In  moclels of child standardized  heights, the
program  is well targeted  to poor households  and to those  authors find no impact of the VL program  expenditures
with  low nutritional status. While the bulk of the  on1  the nutritional outcomes of young children-the
coverage  of the poor is attributed to  targeting of poor  group to whom  the program  is targeted.
districts, the  fact that the poor receive  larger in-kind
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Governments  often subsidize food in an effort to either augment the real incomes of
constituents, or to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups, or both (Pinstrup-
Andersen 1988). Criteria for evaluating such subsidy programs, however, differ for these two
broad objectives. Evaluation of the formner focuses primarily on the incidence of transfers
among subpopulations, while the impact on growth (preferable)  or on incremental  food
consumption  are the standard forms of evaluating the latter. While income transfers do affect
nutrition itself, the impact of food subsidies is greater than that of a cash transfer to the degree
that the commodity subsidy is extramarginal  (that is, the subsidy decreases prices at the
margin) and to the degree that price decreases lead to net increases in nutrient demand after
substitution. Moreover, nutritional impacts are enhanced when program designs encourage
behaviors that target food toward children at risk.
Milk is often believed to be a commodity particularly well suited to meeting
nutritional objectives. This view prevails despite the fact that such subsidies are seldom
targeted towards poorer households  or towards the youngest children within populations
(Kennedy and Alderman  1987). Peru's program to provide milk and milk substitutes to low
income households is an example of a transfer that is motivated by this belief. The program,
called the  Vaso de Leche (VL), uses community-based targeting,  an approach that has proven
progressive in other contexts (Conning and Kevane 2002, Alderman 2001, Galasso and
Ravallion 2002).  The question we thus address in this paper is: If targeting is propoor, is it
possible that a program such as VL can achieve its nutritional objectives in a manner similar
to the well documented  impact of the Women Infant Children (WIC) program in the United
States (Rush and others  1988)? Since randomized evaluations  are often hard to implement in
politically popular transfer programs, we approach this question by linking public expenditure
data with household survey information to illustrate this approach to program impact
assessment.
The next section depicts the details of the VL program. Section 3 describes the various
data sources used in this evaluation, and is followed by a discussion of methodologies used to
assess both the targeting efficiency of the program  as well as its impact on the nutritional
status of children.  Section 5 presents the results.
2.  Description of VL Program
Totaling $97 million in 2001, the VL is the largest social transfer in Peru and the
second largest component of transfers from the central government to municipalities (Instituto
Apoyo and the World Bank 2002). Introduced as a pilot in Lima in 1984, the program
expanded nationally during the economic crises in the late 1980s amd early part of the 1990s.
By 1998, the program had expanded to reach 44 percent of households with children aged 3
through  11  through earmarked monthly transfer to municipalities  (Younger 2002). The
Imunicipalities are required by law to have an administrative committee that includes elected
representatives of beneficiaries, the mayor, another local official,  and a representative  from
the Ministry of Health.
In addition to this administrative committee, each community has an elected VL
mothers' committee. It is this committee, which has a fair degree of  discretion over decision
making (Instituto Apoyo and the World Bank 2002), that determines who the beneficiaries
are, the timing of deliveries and, to a degree, what commodities  are distributed.  Despite its
name, the VL program is not confined to the distribution of  milk or even milk substitutes. In
some case cereals or a combination of commodities  are distributed in lieu of, or in addition to,
milk products. Priority is given to households with children 6 years of age and under, as well
as to households  with pregnant or lactating women.  Once these first-tier beneficiaries are
attended to, second-tier beneficiaries  (children aged 7 to 13, and people with tuberculosis)
may participate. Within these categories, priority is based on need.
There have been a number of excellent recent studies on the distribution of social
expenditures in Peru and of VL in particular. For example, Ruggeri Laderchi (2001) uses one
of the data sources  employed in the current analysis - a 1997 household survey - to illustrate
the overall distribution of food transfers,  as well as their impact on food consumption and
nutrition. She finds that the transfers  are slightly progressive although the poorest 40 percent
of households received only 46 percent of total transfers. However, she also found that, at the
margin, food transfers were entirely spent on food and that if and only ifhousehold income
was treated as endogenous, VL program participation increased standardized child growth by
0.7 standard deviations. Using a different methodology,  Younger (2002)  also confirms the
general pattern of progressive distribution and finds that the increases in coverage between
1994 and 1997 improved this targeting.
A recent Public Expenditure Tracking  Survey (PETS) followed the budget trail from
the central government to the beneficiaries (Instituto Apoyo and the World Bank 2002, World
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 2002). The study found that there was
appreciable variation between communities regarding the timing of delivery,  the commodities
chosen, and the administrative  fees charged. Virtually all the funds released by the center
were transferred to municipal VL administrative budgets  and further down to the level of the
Mothers'  Committees with only some documented small-scale leakage in the allocations.  The
PETS study did find, however, that there were discrepancies between the commodity
allocations reported by the committees  and by the household. They could not account for a
quarter of the total product transferred,  though the majority of the unexplained gap is found in
urban districts (particularly provincial capitals).'
I The PETS study also claimed leakage or dilution in the sense that children did not always receive the milk that
is obtained by the household.  However, not only is this a difficult topic  to quantify,  the welfare interpretations
of this so-called  leakage differ from the leakage in the public expenditure allocation chain.  As argued in
23.  Description of Data Sources
This evaluation of the VL program benefits from a wealth of data sources available in
Peru. The data used in this analysis come from four main sources: (1) information on the
geographic  allocation of VL expenditures; (2) national household living standard surveys; (3)
national demographic  and health surveys; and (4) the Public Expenditure  Tracking Survey
(PETS).
VL Expenditures
The  Vaso de Leche (VL) Program has maintained monthly records of expenditures
allocated to each administrative  (department, province and district) region in Peru since 1994.
We use this information, along with district population sizes from the 1993 census, to
determine real annual total and per capita VL expenditures in each of the recipient districts for
the years 1994 to 2000. It is worth noting that allocations made to the district VL committees
do not translate fully into benefits to recipients.  But, given the small-scale leakages  at least to
the committee level found in the PETS study, we are confident that they represent a
reasonably accurate proxy for the value of benefits available to the district residents.
Living Standard  Surveys
Two sources of household living standard surveys were available for this study. The
first is the Encuesta Nacional  de Hogares  (ENAHO),  collected by the Instituto Nacional de
Estadistica  e Infor7natica  (INEI) in 1998,  1999, and 2000.  These nationally representative
surveys of over 6,500 households (2,000 for the 2000 survey) were carried out quarterly, with
each quarter's survey focusing on a different theme. We concentrate on the second quarter
module which focuses on social services, and include information on participation in the VL
program. Household income information is also available for each module.
The second source is the 1994 and 1997 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre
Medicion de Niveles de Vida (ENNIV) surveys, collected by the Instituto Cuanto. These are
nationally representative surveys of more than 3,500 households that collect multiple
indicators of household and individual well-being (e.g., education, housing, health, economic
activity, consumption  and assets). The  1994 ENNIV includes information on VL participation
by the household, while the 1997 data also includes estimates of the values of the transfers
made to the household. Anthropometric  measurements of heights and weights of young
children were also recorded in the 1997 ENNIV survey.
Alderman and others (1995) an expectation of targeting all consumption of a good to one individual within a
household unit is not easily reconciled with any standard household model.
3Demographic  and Health Surveys
Demographic  and Health Surveys (DHS) were carried out in Peru in 1996 and 2000.
These nationally representative  surveys of over 28,000 households each are part of a program
funded by USAID and implemented by Macro International Inc, which has included over 70
nationally representative household surveys in more than 50 countries.  The DHS surveys are
conducted in single rounds with two main survey instruments:  a household schedule and an
individual questionnaire  for women of reproductive  age (15-49). The household schedule
collects information  on household members, assets and access to public services.  Since
income or expenditure data is not collected, we use the asset data to construct household asset
indices as measures of household wealth (Sahn and Stifel 2001). Child anthropometric
measurements  are recorded in the individual module.
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
The PETS for the VL program was conducted by Instituto Apoyo at the end of 2001
and early in 2002, to quantify leakages  and delays in the process of public expenditure
disbursements, and to assess the effects of deficiencies in the system on the quality of the
services provided. As such, interviews were conducted  at three levels - the municipality,  the
mothers'  committee, and the household.  One hundred municipalities were sampled, from
which four mothers'  committees each were selected randomly, and finally four beneficiary
households were selected randomly from each mothers'  committee  in the sample. Because in
some municipalities there are fewer than four committees, only 393 committees were
interviewed, and  1,587 beneficiary households were interviewed.  The household survey
includes information on household demographics,  assets, and details about participation in the
VL program including values of transfers,  types of products transferred  and information on
additional purchases.
4.  Research Strategy
A.  Program  Targeting
We first address the question of the incidence of distribution of the benefits to the
poor. We ask not only what share of the poor - defined in terms of income or wealth as well
as in terms of nutritional status of children - participate in the program, but also what share of
benefits accrue to different groups. This provides a fair description of both errors of exclusion
and inclusion. We also take this a bit further using a technique to decompose the targeting
efficiency into interdistrict and intradistrict components (Galasso and Ravallion forthcoming).
4Table 1: Notation for Decomposition  of Targeting Efficiency
Poor  Nonpoor  Total
VL Participant  nvlp  nvp  n,  (Share in program)
Not VL Participant  n-vp  n-v.-V  n-v  (Share not in program)
Total  np  nfp  1.0
_  (Share poor)  (Share not poor)
To understand the targeting efficiency decomposition, we begin by categorizing the
shares of households as recipients who are poor (nv p) or nonpoor (n,p), and as nonrecipients
who are poor (n-vp) or nonpoor (n ^ p), as illustrated in Table 1. Given this notation, we can
define a targeting coefficient (7) as the difference between the share of the poor in the
programn ("coverage")  and the share of the nonpoor in the program ("leakage"),
T  nvp  n,-p  V,pn-v,-p  -nvpnv"-p
np  n  p  npn-p
This targeting coefficient lies between -1  and 1. For example, a program targeted
perfectly to the poor is one in which all of the poor are in the program  (i.e., full coverage
where nvp = np) and none of the nonpoor are in the program (i.e., no leakage  where nv p = 0).
This has a targeting coefficient of 1. Conversely, a program targeted perfectly to the nonpoor
is one in which none of the poor are in the program (i.e., no coverage where n, p = 0) and all
of the nonpoor are in the program  (i.e., full leakage where  nv  ,p = nep), and thus T= -1. The
targeting coefficient  takes on a value of zero if the program coverage is exactly offset by the
leakage.
As Galasso  and Ravallion (forthcoming) point out, the targeting coefficient is simply a
measure of association related to the 2x2 contingency table that appears in Table 1. As such it
is directly related to the well known "phi coefficient".
nl
- nV, Pn-,V-p  - n-v.pnv -p  T  "  -p
Inp  -p  n  ,  nvnv
This coefficient  is commonly used to test independence in a contingency  table (since
No  2 _2  (1)). We use this statistic to test the null hypothesis of untargeted program
allocations  (Ho:  0 = o).
Given the decentralized, community-based  nature of targeting for the VL program,  we
want to know more about how various stages of the allocation of benefits contributes to the
national level of targeting. We address just this by decomposing this targeting coefficient  into
San interdistrict ("between")  component and an intradistrict ("within") component. Galasso and
Ravallion  show that the national targeting coefficient can be decomposed as follows,
Tnpd  (npd  IT  ((nd-n)(nd-
d=1  N  np  n P  d=1  N  npn-p
Within  Between
District  District
where Nd is the number of households in district d, N is the overall number of households, and
ND is the number of districts. Thus the intradistrict contribution to overall targeting is simply
the weighted  average of the district targeting coefficients where the weights are the product of
the district population share, the share of all the poor in the country who live in the district,
and the share of all the nonpoor in the country who live in the district.  To interpret these
weights, consider the extremes.  If the entire population of a particular district is poor, then the
weight place on this district is zero (the share of the nonpoor is zero, n-pd =  0) because
intradistrict targeting is irrelevant to overall targeting. The targeting of the district itself is
what matters. Conversely, if the entire population in a district is nonpoor, the weight place on
the district is also zero  (np,d =  O)  by the same reasoning.
These targeting coefficients  and decompositions are estimated using both poverty and
malnutrition as targeting criteria. The poverty targeting coefficients  are estimated using the
ENNIV and ENAHO data where households are defined as poor if their incomes fall below
the official poverty line. The malnutrition targeting coefficients  are estimated using the
ENNIV and DHS data where children are defined as malnourished if their height-for-age  z-
scores are less than -2.
The Galasso and Ravallion targeting coefficient, however,  is defined over the shares
of households/individuals participating in the VL program, not over the shares of benefits
accruing to the different groups. This follows from their assumption of equal transfer values
to all recipients, an assumption in keeping with the program they were investigating.  When
we have differential transfer values for each of the recipient households, we need to redefine
the targeting measure and how to decompose  it. We thus develop an extension to the Galasso
and Ravallion methodology, and apply it to the 1997 ENNIV data.  Begin by defining the
average transfer received by the poor,
VLp=  VLp
Np  i=1
where,  VLp,,  is the value of the VL transfer received by a poor household i, and Np is the total
number of poor households. The average transfer received by the nonpoor is defined
analogously as,
6N
VL  P = N1  VL Pi
N-p  i=1
The targeting differential  (t) can then be defined as the difference between the average
amount going to the poor and the average  amount going to the nonpoor,
t =VLp -VL  p.
The targeting differential, in turn, can be decomposed into inter- and intradistrict
components.  To see this, first note that the average transfers to the poor and nonpoor can be
expressed as weighted averages of the district-level averages,
d=  N  [  n  JVLP,d  [  jfN  7pd.
Some manipulation of this gives the following:
d=1  N  (  n  )(  n  A0d-VLpd)
Within District
+N  Nd (np,d l:n p  np_pd  n - - ( npd Ip np-np,d jV-
d=l  N  np  )t  n-p  )  d=l  N  n p  )  np  )
Between District
The first component is simply the weighted average of the district-level targeting
differentials where the weights are defined analogously to those in the Galasso and Ravallion
decomposition.  As such, this is the contribution of intradistrict targeting to the total targeting
differential. The second component, the weighted  averages of the district average transfers to
the poor and to the nonpoor, represents the contribution of interdistrict targeting to the total
differential.
Finally, the targeting differential is normalized by the average transfer to the poor.
This gives us a "targeting  coefficient'  (T),
T1VL  p T=l-  -
VLp
7Thus for a program targeted perfectly to the poor, the targeting coefficient will take on
a value of 1 since the average transfer value received by the nonpoor is zero (i.e.,  VL  p  = 0).
A program that distributes the benefits perfectly randomly will result in equal values going to
the poor and nonpoor and a targeting coefficient equal to zero (i.e.,  VL  p  = VLp ). Finally, the
targeting coefficient takes on a value of negative infinity when the program is targeted
perfectly to the nonpoor (i.e.,  VLp  = 0 ).
B.  Computing Targeting  according  to Wealth Rankings
As reported above, of all the data sets we are using, only the ENNIV  1997 has
information on both household expenditures/incomes  and values of VL benefits received.
While this implies that we can only assess targeting across expenditure  groups with the
ENNIV dataset, we can still indicate the degree of targeting according to household wealth
using the PETS data. However, to do this, we also have to consider the nature of the PETS
sample. This data set has information on value of transfers at the household level conditional
upon participation in the VL program. No information was collected from nonparticipating
households. Further, the PETS data do not include household expenditures or incomes.
Nonetheless, we can indicate the share of the total program that is received by different
wealth quintiles using the asset data in the PETS (and expenditure data in the ENNIV 1997).
In order to do this for the PETS data, we create a wealth ranking following a methodology
that has been regularly applied to DHS data sets (Sahn and Stifel 2001). In particular, we
construct a wealth index from households'  asset information. This index is the outcome of a
factor analysis of various assets about which the survey asks: household characteristics  (water
source, toilet facilities,  and construction material) and durables (ownership of radio,
television, refrigerator,  bicycle, motorcycle and/or car), as well as education of the household
head.  We assume that there is a common factor, "wealth," that explains the variance in the
ownership of these assets, and allow the factor analysis to define that factor as a weighted sum
of the individual assets.2
By using the weights derived from the 2000 DHS to construct a wealth index for the
PETS sample, we are able to determine how the households sampled in the latter survey rank
relative to the overall national population.  Although the PETS used a sample frame of
recipients, we have sample weights and municipal populations and therefore can derive the
proportion of VL recipients in each jurisdiction.  Since our unit of analysis is the household,
the assumption necessary to derive the proportion of VL households in each jurisdiction is
that the share of beneficiary households for a particular committee to all households is the
same as the share of beneficiaries  in the committee to all beneficiaries.
2  See Sahn and Stifel (2001) for a detailed discussion of  the factor analysis methodology,  and for an evaluation
of this type of asset index.  Hammer (1998) and Filmer and Pritchett (2001) have employed a similar
methodology.
8C.  Modeling the Determinants of Nutritional  Status
After illustrating the targeting efficiency we then model child nutritional status using a
framework derived from a household model in the tradition of Becker (1991). Assume that the
household maximizes a quasi-concave  utility function that takes as its arguments consumption
of commodities and services, x, and the leisure, 1, and health status,  9  (of which a child's
anthropometric  measurement,  h, is one dimension), of each household member.  The
household solves the following problem,
maxu(x,1,9;A,Z),
X,/,@
where A and Z respectively represent household and community characteristics,  some of
which are not observed.  Allocation choices  are conditional on the budget constraint:
px =w(T -1) + y,
where p is a vector of prices, w is a vector of household members'  wages, T is a vector of the
household members' maximum number of work hours, and y is household nonwage income.
The nutritional status of children, h, is determined by a biological health production
technology:
hi = h(I,  A,Z,H,u,
where I is a vector of health inputs and  ,ui represents the unobservable  individual, family, and
community characteristics  that affect the child's nutritional outcomes.  Household
characteristics (e.g.,  demographics,  educational levels, etc.), A,  can have an impact on health
by affecting household allocation decisions. Community characteristics,  Z, such as access to
clean water, can also have direct impacts on nutritional outcomes. Note that the input vector,
I, includes consumption goods which contribute positively to household welfare both directly
through x, and indirectly through h. This represents the simultaneous choice of consumption
goods and health inputs.
Solving the household's optimization problem leads to reduced-form demand
equations including those for consumption,  nutrition inputs, and child nutrition. The nutrition
functions for each child conditional  on per capita expenditures (quasi-reduced  form) can be
represented as follows:
hi = h(X,A,Z,6i),
where c, is the child-specific random disturbance term, which as such is assumed to be
uncorrelated with the other elements of the demand function. Since consumption, x, is a
choice variable, it is unlikely that it is uncorrelated with the disturbance term, and
instrumental  variables approaches are typically employed. This is the model that we estimate,
substituting an asset index for x as instruments, using the 1996 and 2000 DHS data.
9The dependent variable is the standardized anthropometric height-for-age  z-score
(HAZ). HAZ is defined  as (h-hr)/ur  where h is the observed height of a child of a specified
sex/age  group, h, is the median height in the reference population of children of that sex/age
group,  and or, is the standard deviation of height measurement for the reference population of
that sex/age group. The standard reference population recommended by the World Health
Organization is that of the United States National Center for Health Statistics.  As several
studies have indicated that less than  10 percent of the worldwide variance in height can be
ascribed to genetic or racial differences (Martorell and Habicht 1986), this reference
population is appropriate.  Children with a HAZ score less than -2 are usually classified as
stunted.
The set of predictors consists of  characteristics of the child (e.g.,  age, gender, birth
order), household demographic variables such as household size and age-sex composition,
characteristics of the parents (e.g., educational attainment,  and mother's age and height),
access to public services (e.g., piped drinking water), and an urban dummy.
We seek not only to model the overall determinants of nutrition, but also to see if the
VL program has an impact on nutrition. However,  as households chose to participate, we have
an issue of self selection if we include households'  VL participation as an explanatory
variable. If we use the VL allocation to the community in lieu of participation, we solve the
issue of endogenous household choice, but only at the expense of introducing potential bias
from endogenous program placement (Rosenzweig  and Wolpin  1986). The bias, if any, can
not even be signed with confidence since an estimated impact may be an overestimate  (if
programs are placed where the anticipated return is higher than average) or negative (if
programs go to favored but more developed  communities). We address this issue by taking
advantage of the fact that we have two observations on the VL expenditures that correspond
to different rounds of DHS surveys. Thus, we can use fixed effects estimations that control for
the initial conditions in the communities. The general form of the models that we estimate is
as follows:
hi=d ,,  +  t  +  t+  i,d,  +  i,d,  t  + YVLd,,  +  5  E  d  d+6i,d,t
d
where i is the index for individual children, d is the indicator for the district in which the child
resides, and t is the year (1996 or 2000).  VL is the district level per capita VL expenditure,  and
D is the set of district dummies. We merge the district-level VL expenditure data with the
DHS data for 1996 and 2000 to create a dataset with 19,053  observations on child heights
upon which we estimate the model. The per capita VL district expenditure variable is the
district average  amount spend on in the two years prior to and including the survey (i.e.,
1994-1996 for the 1996 DHS, and 1998-2000  for the 2000 DHS).
In assessing the effect of VL expenditures on child nutritional outcomes (HAZ), the
parameter of interest is y. Even using district fixed-effects, ordinary least squares (OLS)
10estimates of this model, however, can still be biased if there are unobserved factors (e.g.,
capabilities or poverty) that vary over time and are correlated with VL. We thus estimate the
model using instrumental variables (IV) methods. The identifying instrument we use is the
district-level Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) index of unmet basic needs, an composite
of various measures - including access to schooling, electricity, water, sanitation, adequate
housing, and measures of illiteracy - based on the 1993 census (Schady 2002). As we will see
in the results, the FONCODES index is correlated with district-level VL expenditures,
satisfying one condition for valid instruments. The other condition, that it is uncorrelated with
the error term, is plausible given that the index was formulated based on the 1993 census,
three years prior to the 1996 DHS survey, and thus is unlikely to be correlated with changes in
unobserved factors.
Although we pool the surveys, implicitly restricting the parameters of individual and
household characteristics  to be constant over time, we do allow the instrumenting equations to
vary between periods. This is done in two ways; (1) with a time dummy included as a shifter,
and (2) allowing all of the parameters  to vary over time. We thus estimate seven variations of
the model. First, we use OLS to estimate the basic nonfixed effects model, as well as the
district fixed effects model. Then the basic model is re-estimated using time-varying IV. This
model is then run with province-level  (not district) dummy variables, since time-varying
district dummies in the instrumenting equation would perfectly predict the district-level VL
expenditure values. Finally, the basic model along with district- and province-level  fixed




We confirm that the VL program is reasonably well targeted  to households in terms of
their income status. This is done by comparing the coverage rates of households according to
their per capita income levels3 for five household surveys (Table 2). The percentage of
households with children of age six and under (Tier I target group)  that receive VL transfers
declines sharply with the level of income. For example, coverage rates declined from 37
percent of the households  in the two poorest quintiles to less than 8 percent in the richest in
1994. As the coverage for all households with children increased over time from 28 percent in
1994 to 48 percent in 2000, coverage in the two poorest quintiles rose from just over 37
percent to over 66 percent during this period. While there was a concurrent increase for the
more well-off people in the population, the poorest 40 percent of the eligible households
nonetheless received over three times as much as the richest 20 percent on average. A similar
pattern is observed for all households, not just those with young children (Table 3).
3 Household per capita consumption is used for the 1994  and 1997 ENNIV data.
11Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis of no targeting is confidently rejected in the
direction of targeting toward the poor (i.e.,  a positive targeting coefficient). Despite the
increase of leaking to the well off as the program expanded, the targeting coefficient increased
from 24 to 35. Although the levels of coverage and leakage are lower when we evaluate
targeting based on poverty among all households, not just those with young children,  their
relative magnitudes do not differ much. As such, the positive targeting coefficients are quite
similar.
Table 2: Vaso de Leche  Coverage Rates for Tier I Households
Transfers per  capita
Quintiles ofper capita incomea  (1997 Soles)
ENNIV  ENNIV  Enaho  Enaho  Enaho  ENNIV
1994  1997  1998  1999  2000
Quintiles  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  1997
Poorest  39.3  60.5  65.5  59.4  68.2  26
2  37.0  52.4  61.5  50.0  66.9  30
3  34.3  44.6  48.2  39.4  49.4  19
4  20.1  30.7  36.0  29.3  37.3  22
Richest  7.8  15.8  20.2  15.8  15.2  7
Total  27.7  40.8  46.3  38.8  47.5  21
Note: Domain is the set of households with at least one child of age 6 and under.
a. Consumption for ENNIV  1994 and 1997.
Table 3: Percentage of All Households  Benefiting  from Vaso  de Leche Transfers
Transfers  per capita
Quintiles of weighted  per capita  incomea  (1997 Soles)
ENNIV  ENNIV  Enaho  Enaho  Enaho  ENNIV
1994  1997  1998  1999  2000
Quintiles  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  1997
Poorest  35.0  52.1  55.8  56.1  57.6  23
2  29.3  43.4  43.7  45.2  48.6  25
3  20.9  30.4  32.1  34.0  26.1  20
4  9.3  19.3  20.7  24.9  19.3  16
Richest  4.3  5.9  9.2  8.2  8.7  4
Total  19.7  30.2  32.3  33.7  32.1  18
Note: Domain is the set of households in the samples.
a. Consumption for ENNIV  1994 and 1997.
12The VL program also appears to be well targeted to the expected age group in the
sense that leakage to households without any children of age six and under is relatively small.
Further, despite substantive growth in total expenditures  and in the number of participating
families since 1994, the share of households without young children that received VL
transfers only rose approximately 4 percentage points from 8 percent in 1994 to 12 percent in
2000. These figures admittedly overestimate the degree of leakage, given that some of these
households may have pregnant women and/or may have children who were recently in the age
bracket.
Targeting of expenditure levels-as opposed to the number of participants-is  also
directed toward the poor,  as indicated in Table 5. Over 60 percent (and up to 76 percent,
depending on the year) of the value of all transfers is allocated to poor households.4 Among
households with young children, the average transfer to poor households is 54 Soles greater
than the average transfer to nonpoor households.
Table 4: Targeting Performance of Vaso de Leche Expenditures
Percent  of "poor"  Percent  of "nonpoor"
in the program  in the program  Targeting  Probability
Data  set /year  (coverage)  (leakage)  coefficient  of  untargeted
Targeting based  on poverty among households with kids of age 6 and under...
ENNIV 1994  36.02  12.43  23.59  0.001
ENNIV 1997  52.55  23.49  29.07  0.001
Enaho  1998  58.34  28.34  30.49  0.001
Enaho  1999  60.95  30.19  30.76  0.001
Enaho 2000  61.83  27.03  34.80  0.001
Targeting based on poverty among all households...
ENNIV 1994  29.94  8.25  21.69  0.001
ENNIV 1997  45.42  16.31  29.11  0.001
Enahe 1998  47.50  18.25  29.24  0.001
Enaho  1999  48.86  19.64  29.22  0.001
Enaho 2000  48.58  16.84  31.74  0.001
Targeting based on child malnutrition
ENNIV 1994  42.47  26.24  16.23  0.001
DHS  1996  40.23  24.57  15.66  0.001
ENNIV 1997  63.45  39.62  23.83  0.001
4Note that the poverty headcount ratio is 48 percent.
13Table 5:. Poverty Targeting Performance of Vaso de Leche Expenditures-Values  of Transfers
Percent  of transfers  Average per capita
allocated  to...  transfer  to...
Targeting
Data  set and  year  Poor  Nonpoor  Difference  Poor  Nonpoor  coefficient
All transfers to households with children of age 6 and under
ENNIV  1997  0.72  0.28  0.44  25.3  14.7  42.1
PETS 2002  0.74  0.26  0.48
All transfers
ENNIV  1997  0.63  0.37  0.25  23.2  12.2  45.2
PETS 2002  0.76  0.24  0.52
We use the living standards measurement  surveys (ENNIV) for 1994 and 1997 to get a
better sense of  how targeting of the poor changed over time.  In particular, we estimate simple
regressions of (a) the district per capita VL transfers on the percent of the district population
that is poor; (b) the share of the district population participating  in the VL program on the
percent of the district population that is poor; and (c) the average value of per capita district
VL transfers received by recipients on an indicator of the particular household's poverty
status. Each of  these models is estimated for both the 1994 and 1997 samples and the
difference in the elasticity (marginal effect) estimates for the district (household) regressions
were tested. The results (Table 6) indicate that while the poor are targeted, with positive
elasticities of per capita district transfers with respect to the district poverty rate, the degree of
this expenditure targeting fell substantially between  1994 and 1997.
Nonetheless,  the effect of the poverty rate of a district on the percentage of the district
population participating increased over this period with the elasticities rising from 0.6 to 0.8.
The effect of this increase in coverage appears to have offset the decline in targeting of
district expenditure  levels, to the extent that poor recipients received increasingly larger
transfers than the nonpoor on average in 1997 than they did in 1994.
Turning to nutrition-based targeting, the VL program  also is concentrated  on
households with low nutritional status of children. This is illustrated in Table 7, where
coverage rates of all children under five years of age are presented by quintile of height-for-
age z-scores (HAZ) for the three household surveys with information on both VL
participation and anthropometric  status of children.  In 1997, for example, 64 percent of the
children in the least well-nourished  quintile lived in households  that received VL food
transfers, while just over 30 percent were in the most nourished quintile. Nonetheless, despite
the fact that the primary stated objective of the VL program is to reduce the levels of
malnutrition in Peru, over a third of the intended beneficiaries in the most malnourished
quintile were missed.
14Table 6: Changes in District-Level  Poverty Targeting of Vaso  de Leche Transfers, 1994-1997
Dependent
variables  Elasticities  Marginal  effects
Average value
Per capita  Share of district  ofper capita
district  population  transfers  for
Year  transfers  t-stat  participating  t-stat  recipients  t-stat
1994  1.21  11.18  **  0.577  5.99  **  1.55  8.51  **
1997  0.19  2.01  *  0.815  9.81  **  3.15  18.93  **
Difference  -1.02  -7.15  **  0.238  1.90  +  1.60  6.46  **
Note: Independent variable for district level models is  the district headcount ratio.  For the household model, the
independent  variable is  an indicator of whether the household is  poor or not.
** indicates significance at 99% level of confidence,  * at 95%  level of confidence, and + at 90% level of
confidence.
Although the nutrition targeting coefficients presented in Table 4 are positive and
significant, they are considerably smaller than those found when using poverty as the
targeting criterion. This follows from the degree of leakage being higher for malnutrition than
for poverty (i.e., a greater share of healthy children participate in the program relative to the
share of nonpoor households benefiting from VL transfers). Nevertheless, coverage rates of
all malnourished kids under the age of five exceed the percentage of nonmalnourished
benefiting from VL transfers - hence the positive targeting coefficient.
Moreover,  it is possible that targeting of children based on ex-ante nutritional needs
may have resulted in improved ex-post outcomes.  In fact, this is the stated intent of the
program - to improve the nutritional status of children. This could explain the low levels of
coverage of malnourished children. However, if targeting based on ex-ante needs is
persistently effective, then as the nutritional status of participants improves over time, a
deterioration in the targeting coefficient should be observed. This appears not to be the case,
as the coverage rates for malnourished children rose between  1994 and 1997 (Table 4).
Table 7: Percentage of Children Under Five in VL Program
(percent)
Quintiles of  height-for-age  Z-scores
ENNIV  DHS  ENNIV
Quintiles  1994  1996  1997
1  42.8  41.6  64.0
2  33.8  33.2  49.2
3  28.4  26.4  41.8
4  25.4  21.7  34.8
5  20.0  20.8  30.5
Total  30.1  28.7  44.1
Note: Domain is the set of children with HAZ scores.
15Since the mechanism to target and distribute  food under the VL program is
decentralized, it is useful to ascertain the degree to which this overall targeting reflects budget
allocations to various districts and the degree to which it reflects within district prioritization.
Nonparametric  regressions (LOWESS) based on a census of first grade students in 1999 and
VL expenditure data indicate that VL expenditure  levels were targeted toward districts with
higher levels of child malnutrition (Figure 1). Increases in VL expenditures between  1997 and
1999 are also slightly targeted to districts with higher levels of stunting (Figure 2).
To take this further, we decompose the targeting coefficients based on both poverty
and nutrition using the method in Galasso and Ravallion (forthcoming).  We find that
interdistrict targeting dominates intradistrict targeting (left columns of Table 8). In other
words, the degree of overall targeting (coverage of individuals  less leakage) attributable to the
central government's allocation to districts is greater than that attributable to allocations made
within the districts by the municipalities and the mother's committees (Club de Madres). The
interdistrict  contribution to overall targeting based on poverty status increased from 53
percent in 1994, to over 70 percent in 2000 when considering propoor targeting. Similarly,
some three-quarters of targeting towards malnourished children can be attributed to targeting
of districts as opposed to malnourished children within districts.
We note, however, that the decompositions that appear in the first set of columns in
Table 8 are defined over population shares (i.e., share of poor in the program versus share of
nonpoor in the program), not values. When the targeting coefficient defined over transfer
values is decomposed (right-hand  columns of  Table 8), we find the opposite - that intradistrict
targeting dominates interdistrict targeting.  In 1997, the only year for which we are able to
evaluate this form of targeting, over two-thirds of targeting took place within the districts, and
less than a third can be attributed to interdistrict allocations.  This follows from poor
households within districts receiving larger transfers in value terms (consistent with the last
columns in Tables 2 and 3, and to the last set of columns in Table 6) relative to the shares of
the poor within districts participating in the VL program.
16Figure 1: District Targeting of Vaso de Leche Expenditures
Based on Stunting Rates In Peru, 1999
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O  0  P. 0~~~1Table 8: Decomposing Targeting Performance  of VL Expenditures
(percent)
Participants  Value of  transfer
Data  set and  year  Intradistrict  Interdistrict  Intradistrict  Interdistrict
Targeting  based on poverty among households with kids of age 6 and  under...
ENNIV  1994  46.7  53.3
ENNIV  1997  42.2  57.8  67.1  32.9
Enaho  1998  40.2  59.8
Enaho  1999  39.7  60.3
Enaho 2000  21.6  78.4
Targeting  based  on poverty among all households...
ENNIV  1994  48.1  51.9
ENNIV  1997  47.6  52.4  73.0  27.0
Enaho 1998  46.1  53.9
Enaho  1999  44.6  55.4
Enaho 2000  29.7  70.3
Targeting  based on child malnutrition
ENNIV  1994  25.4  74.6
DHS 1996  14.6  85.4
ENNIV  1997  26.8  73.2
A plausible explanation for greater interdistrict targeting in terms of population
coverage and leakage, and greater intradistrict targeting in terms of the value of transfers
received by the poor, could be that the Mother's Committees  feel compelled to distribute at
least some food to as many people as possible, but give larger transfers to the poor.5 On the
one hand, since relatively high percentages of the district populations participate  (i.e., receive
at least some transfers), the choice of the district matters in terms of maximizing coverage of
the poor participating while minimizing leakage (i.e., nonpoor participating).  This manifests
itself in the interdistrict contribution to targeting dominating.  On the other hand, among those
that receive transfers, the average value of transfers to the poor is almost double of that to the
nonpoor. Thus the intradistrict allocation of food items among recipients matters to the degree
of targeting of the poor - i.e., intradistrict targeting dominates interdistrict targeting.
Correlates  of  Participation  and Transfer Values
While the stated targeting criteria (Tier I and II beneficiaries)  are clear, participation
may actually reflect decisions made by the eligible households in addition to those of the
5We thank Steve Younger for pointing this out.
18distribution committees (Duclos 1995). As such, we now turn to estimates of the factors
affecting the participation of households in the VL program.  Table 9 presents the
determinants of the probability of receiving VL transfers using the 1997 ENNIV survey data.6
The dependent variable in these probit models is an indicator for participation in the VL
among all households in the sample. The explanatory variables include household
demographics, characteristics of the household head, per capita consumption as a proxy for
wealth, and district fixed-effects dummies. Three models are presented based on different
forms in which household per capita consumption enters as an explanatory variable.  In the
first model, household wealth is controlled for in the form of dummies for the quintile of per
capita consumption into which the household falls. In the second and third models, the log of
per capita consumption is used, with reported consumption used in the former,  and given its
endogeneity,  instrumented consumption  is used in the latter.
These three models are qualitatively and statistically the same, and confirm that VL
transfers are targeted to young children and to poor households. For example, a household
with an additional child of age 6 and under is  11 percent more likely to benefit relative to the
average household (which has just one such child). Since the questionnaire did not identify
women who were pregnant, we cannot precisely identify the remaining Tier I target group.8
As such, it is not surprising that, controlling for the number of children, the number of women.
in the household does not affect the probability of participation.  With regard to the Tier II
target group, an additional child between that ages of 7 and 15 makes the household three
percent more likely to receive VL benefits than the average household.
6Ruggeri Laderchi (2001)  estimates  simnilar probits for participation  in any feeding program, not just Vaso de
Leche. Her results are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
The instruments used in Model 3 are education of  the household head, emnployment status of the head, an
indicator of ownership of a business or farm, and an indicator for the head holding two jobs.
8Lactating women are not missed since they obviously live in a household with a young child.
19Table 9: Determinants of the Probability (Probit) of Receiving  Vaso  de Leche Transfers, ENNIV
1997
Model I  Model 2  Model 3
Marginal  z-stat  Marginal' z-stat  Marginal  z-stat
effect  effect  effect
No.Kids0-6  0.117  11.88  **  0.111  11.34  **  0.110  10.85**
No. of kids 7-15  0.031  4.14  **  0.025  3.29  **  0.024  3.05  **
No. of women 16-25  -0.008  -0.67  -0.006  -0.53  -0.008  -0.63
No. of women 26-65  -0.015  -1.04  -0.013  -0.91  -0.017  -1.19
No. of men 16-25  -0.021  -1.84  +  -0.024  -2.09  *  -0.026  -2.29  *
No. of men 26-65  -0.030  -1.96  *  -0.028  -1.87  +  -0.031  -2.07  *
Spanish speaking head  -0.106  -4.37  **  -0.104  -4.19  **  -0.102  -4.12 **
Male head  -0.049  -2.23  *  -0.050  -2.25  *  -0.049  -2.20  *
Age of head  -0.001  -0.30  -0.001  -0.32  -0.001  -0.14
Age of head squared  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  -0.02  0.0000  -0.19
Log per capita consumption  -0.177  -10.00  **
Log per capita consumption (IV)  -0.178  -9.51  **
2nd consumption quintile  -0.003  -0.16
3rd consumption quintile  -0.079  -3.08  **
4th consumption quintile  -0.137  -5.77  **
5th consumption quintile  -0.240  -8.28  **
<Department dummies omitted>
No. of observations  3,752  3,752  3,752
Wald chi2  970.52  973.90  961.17
DF  45  42  42
Pseudo-R2  0.215  0.216  0.213
Note: Instruments in IV  models are education of head, employmnent  status of  head, dummy for own business/farm, head
holds two jobs; jointly significant at I level (F(9,3752)=12.62).
**  indicates significance at 99 level of confidence, * at 95 level of  confidence,  and + at 90 level of confidence.
Poorer households are more likely to benefit from VL transfers. Households in the
poorest quintile are 25 percent more likely to participate than are those in the richest quintile
and 14 percent more likely compared to the fourth quintile. This difference is additional to
any difference due to the greater number of children and other observed characteristics  that
correlate with poverty such as ethnicity and the gender of the household head. Using Spanish-
speaking household heads as a proxy for nonindigenous households,  we find no
discrimination against indigenous households; indeed they are  10 percent more likely to
receive VL transfers than nonindigenous households with similar expenditures.  Similarly,
female-headed households are 5 percent more likely to participate.
We now turn to an assessment of how the determinants of VL participation  affect the
amount of the actual transfers. We pursue this because of the possibility that the determinants
of participation and the determinants of the transfer values conditional  on participating may
20differ. Since the transfer values are censored at zero for nonparticipants, we estimate Tobit
models with value of the per capita transfer in 1997 Soles as the endogenous variable.
These Tobit estimates (Table 10) suggest that, conditional on the number of eligible
beneficiaries, poorer households receive more from the VL program.  The wealth
(consumption) elasticity of the value of transfers estimated in model 2 (OLS) is -0.9. In the
IV model (3) it is greater at -3.8. In other words,  once we control  for the endogeneity of
household consumption levels (as well as any errors in consumption measurement) in the
estimation, we find that a one percent decrease in consumption corresponds to a 3.8 percent
higher per capita value of food transferred under the VL program. From another perspective,
as illustrated in the first model, once we control for other factors that determine the level of
VL transfers received by households, the average transfer value to households in the poorest
40 percent of the population is 95 Soles larger than for households in the richest quintile.
Again, indigenous households and female-headed households receive larger transfers.
In all three models, per capita transfer values increase with the number of children of
age 6 and under. The negative quadratic indicates that these benefits diminish with the
number of such Tier I children.9 However, the OLS models appear to overestimate the size of
this effect at an over 45 Sole increase for an additional child (with the quadratic evaluated at
the mean number of children,  1.07), while the IV estimate is 38 Soles. Given that the average
per capita transfer among beneficiary households is 49 Soles, an additional young child for a
household that already has one young child increases the per capita transfer to the household
by over three-quarters.  Further, while the IV estimates  for kids between the age of 7 and 15
are positive and significant for the OLS estimates  at about 22 Soles, the effect of the number
of children in this age bracket is considerably smaller (15 Soles) for the IV model.
9Note that the maximum is attained at 7.0 for model 1,  6.4 for model 2, and 5.9 for model 3. These are all
greater than the maximum number of children under seven in a household  (five) in the sample.
21Table 10. Determinants of the value  of Vaso  de Leche  transfers (Tobit)  received  by households,  ENNIV  1997
Summary Statistics  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3
Mean  S.D.  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat
Per Capita VL Transfer  Value"  49.39  76.99
No.  of kids 0-6  1.07  1.05  54.71  9.18  **  54.62  9.15  **  46.21  6.64  **
No. of kids 0-6 squared  -7.79  -4.98  **  -8.49  -5.39  **  -7.82  -4.89  *
No. of kids 7-15  1.37  1.28  25.49  5.03  **  25.50  5.03  *  17.95  3.02  +
No. of kids 7-15 squared  -2.53  -2.16  *  -3.04  -2.58  **  -2.30  -1.91  +
No.  of women  16-25  0.61  0.77  8.41  2.68  **  9.46  3.03  **  6.03  1.79  +
No. of women  26-65  1.12  0.67  3.07  0.77  3.96  1.00  2.06  0.52
No. of men  16-25  0.58  0.85  -3.55  -1.21  -4.14  -1.41  -8.15  -2.52  *
No. of men 26-65  1.05  0.65  -0.870  -0.20  0.025  0.01  -1.542  -0.36
Spanish speaking head  0.772  0.42  -17.54  -2.63  **  -15.66  -2.33  *  -8.22  -1.11
Male head  0.871  0.33  -15.39  -2.11  *  -13.97  -1.92  +  -14.31  -1.96  *
Age of head  48  14  -0.570  -0.50  -0.610  -0.53  -0.160  -0.14
Age  of head  squared  0.0021  0.19  0.0022  0.20  -0.0025  -0.22
Log per capita consumption  7.72  0.66  -48.52  -9.60  **
Log per capita consumption  (IV)  -68.64  -5.50  **
2nd per capita consumption  quintile  0.20  0.40  -3.10  -0.48
3rd  per capita  consumption  quintile  0.20  0.40  -8.67  -1.23
4th per capita consumption  quintile  0.20  0.40  -29.16  -3.62  **
5th per capita consumption quintile  0.20  0.40  -94.45  -8.97  **
<Department  dummies ommitted>
Constant  -116.4  -3.29  **  223.7  4.47  **  379.2  3.88  **
No. of observations  3,752  3,752  3,752  3,752
Wald chi2  804.39  790.75  723.18
DF  45  42  42
Pseudo  R2  0.051  0.050  0.459
Note:  Instruments  in IV  models  are education of head, employment  status  of head,  dummy for own business/farm,
head holds two jobs, frequency of payments.
a.  Mean value  conditional on receiving  transfers.
** indicates  signficance  at 99%  level of confidence,  * at 95%  level of confidence,  and + at 90%  level of confidence.
22The PETS data also permit us to examine the relationship between wealth and the
types of VL transfers. While we find that the mean transfer to households in the poorest
national asset index quintile is 23 percent larger than to households in the richest quintile, the
bulk of this comes in the form of milk products (Table 11). For example,  the mean value of
milk product transfers to the poorest quintile is 135 Soles, and 18 for milk substitutes and
other products.  Conversely, the mean values of other product received in the other quintiles
are between 52 and 100 percent of the mean value of milk product they receive.  As such, milk
product transfers are generally progressive in the values received by the beneficiaries,  while
transfers of nonmilk products are not.
Table 11: Values of Vaso de Leche  Transfers to Beneficiaries
Mean value
(Soles)  Shares of total transfer  value
Asset index  Total  Milk  Other
Total  Milk  Other  transfer  products  products
Quintiles  transfer  products  products  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
Poorest  152.6  135.1  17.5  23.1  32.3  7.2
2  121.0  71.6  49.4  34.4  32.1  38.3
3  141.4  70.7  70.6  33.2  26.3  45.3
4  157.2  103.3  53.9  8.3  8.6  7.8
Richest  123.7  55.4  68.3  1.0  0.7  1.5
Total  136.7  86.6  50.1  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Public Expenditure Tracking Study, 2002.
As with the mean transfer level, milk transfers appear to be distributed progressively
among the bulk of the recipients,  unlike nonmilk transfers. While the poorest quintile receives
32 percent of all milk transfers, only 7 percent of other transfers make it to the poorest
households.  In fact, households  in the third quintile receive over 45 percent of all of these
other transfers.
Marginal  Targeting
Our discussion of targeting thus far has concentrated on average participation rates.
The assumption implicit in this analysis has been that an expansion of the VL program leads
to increases in benefits to current recipients. In other words, we implicitly assume that all
changes would take place at the intensive margin.  But two forms of expansion can take place:
(1) current recipients can receive larger transfers (intensive margin) and (2) participation rates
can increase (extensive margin).
To elaborate on how we might identify the effects at the extensive margin, and in
particular how a program expansion might affect participation rates, first note that the
23expected value of the VL transfer to household i is equal to the product of the probability of
participating  and the expected value of the transfer conditional upon participation,
E(VL,)  = Pr(VL, > 0) *  E(VL,  I  VL,  > 0).
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to the change in the VL grants to the
community (G) and applying the chain rule, gives us the following decomposition,
(  i)=[  Pr(VL, >0 ) E(VL,VVL,>)]+[Pr(V  O)E(L'I  0)]
Extensive  Intensive
Margin  Margin
The object of interest is the change in the probability of participation with a change in the
grant to the community. Rearranging terms gives us
6Pr(VL, > 0)  1  (  VE(VL)  P((V  0)  3E(V,  I  VL,  >0))
9G  E(VL,  I  VLI  >0  G  S 
A common assumption that we make here is that an increase in transfers from the committees
is equal to the grant (i.e., that there is no change in the leakage when there is a change in the
size of grant),
E(VL)  -1.
The expected value of transfers for recipients  ( E(VL,  I  VL,  > 0) ) and the probability of
participation (Pr(VL,  > 0))  are estimated using the 1997 ENNIV data. The change in the
expected transfer for participants for a change in the grant,
E(VL,  I  VL,  >  0)
SG
is also be estimated using the ENNIV data by regressing per capita VL transfer values among
recipient households on district level per capita VL expenditures,  correcting for selection into
the sample of recipients. Note that since this is estimated on a cross-section,  an identifying
assumption is that new and old recipients receive similar transfer values.
The estimates give the following,
243E(VL)  _  [Pr(VL, >  0)E  Ei  0  E(L' 1  VL'  >0)1
(  =[  E(VL,  I  VL,  > O)]+[Pr(VL, > 0)  (  '




In other words, we find that roughly half (0.518) of an expansion in the VL program
grants benefits  existing participants,  and the other half (0.482) benefits new participants.
Further, for a one Sole increase in per capita VL grants, we estimate that the probability of
participation increases by one percent.
Inframarginality  of Transfers
Further, the PETS data can give us a sense of how the in-kind VL transfers compare to
equivalent cash transfers.  In other words, we can get an indication of whether the quantities of
milk provided to households by the program are equal to the marginal increases  in the
quantities of milk consumed by those households. If so the transfers are considered to be
extramarginal,  and are expected to have a larger impact on milk consumption than an
inframarginal program might have. This follows from the general equivalence of
inframarginal transfers and cash transfers of the same value.  Extramarginal transfers have a
price effect as well.  10
We find that nearly half of all the recipients consume additional amounts of the
products distributed to them through the VL program (Table  12). For example, for the 80
percent of the recipients who receive milk and milk substitutes from the VL program, 49
percent purchase additional milk and milk substitutes.  For 30 percent of the households that
receive milk/dairy products, the program is inframarginal for 43 percent of them with respect
to these particular products. While only 3 percent of those households that receive milk
substitutes (53 percent of recipient households) purchase additional milk substitutes, most of
these households also purchase milk/dairy products. In other words, for half of these
households, the VL program is inframarginal  over the more broadly defined category of milk
and milk substitutes (hence the 49 percent figure above), but not for milk substitutes alone.
Io  The transfer is extra-marginal  if ex-post consumption (what we observe) is exactly equal to the transfer - i.e.,
the recipient would consume  less of the product if the transfer was in the form of cash (he/she  is consuming at
the kink in the budget constraint). Alternatively,  if she purchases additional amounts of the product, then the
transfer is infra-marginal.
25Table 12: Inframarginality of Vaso de Leche Transfers
Share of beneficiary  households
Total  Poorest  2nd  3rd  4th  Richest
That receive...
Milk/dairy products  29.4  18.4  20.1  23.0  32.9  41.3
Milk substitutes  53.3  74.8  48.8  43.2  51.5  48.7
Milk and milk substitutes  79.5  89.6  67.3  63.9  81.7  85.4
Other products  58.3  22.3  58.7  62.6  62.9  74.9
That purchase  additional*...
Milk/dairy products  42.5  20.7  14.6  30.4  52.1  52.6
Milk substitutes  2.6  2.2  3.0  4.1  1.5  3.0
Milk and milk substitutes  48.6  36.1  38.9  36.4  57.2  58.7
Other products  26.5  9.7  19.7  15.0  26.6  37.1
Share of beneficiary households that receive the product.
These results suggest that, assuming cash transfers are less costly and more efficiently
distributed than food transfers, cash transfers may be a supenor means of increasing the
consumption  of milk and milk substitutes for half of the recipient households. However,  we
find that the milk and milk substitutes are inframarginal for 36 percent of the poorest quintile
compared to 59 percent of the richest quintile.
Thus, although we find that the VL program is reasonably well targeted to the
expected beneficiary groups, to the poor, and to the malnourished,  it is unclear ex ante what
effect the program has had on reducing child malnutrition.  We now turn to an econometric
analysis in an effort to shed light on this.
Impact of VL Transfers on Nutritional  Outcomes
In this section we assess the impact of the VL food transfer program on nutrition by
examining how the transfers affect child nutritional outcomes.  We do this by estimating
quasi-reduced form models with standardized height-for-age  z-scores (HAZ) of children
under five years of age as the dependent variable.  The summary statistics of the variables used
in the model appear in Table  13.
These quasi-reduced  form models are conditioned on the asset index as a proxy for the
potentially endogenous household expenditures.  In all of the models, the parameter estimates
are positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence, indicating that
household wealth has a positive impact on child nutritional  status. The magnitude of the
parameter estimates, however, are sensitive to the identifying assumptions made in the
estimation of the asset index (see Sahn and Stifel 2001).
26Table  13: Means of Variables in HEAZ Models DHS, 1996 & 2000
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev
HAZ  -1.11  1.34
Per Capita VL District Expenditures  31.90  7.63
Asset Index  -0.10  0.90
Male dummy  0.50  0.50
Multiple birth dummy  0.01  0.11
Birth order -- 2nd Child  0.22-  0.42
Birth order -- 3rd Child  0.16  0.37
Birth order-- 4th Child  0.10  0.30
Birth order -- 5th Child  0.07  0.25
Birth order-- 6th+ Child  0.14  0.35
Age 0-6 months  0.10  0.30
Age 7-12 months  0.10  0.31
Age  13-18 months  0.10  0.30
Age 25-35 months  0.19  0.39
Age 36-59 months  0.41  0.49
Share HH members age 0-5  0.30  0.13
Share HH girls age 6-15  0.10  0.12
Share HH boys age 6-15  0.10  0.12
Share HH women 16-25  0.10  0.12
Share HH women 26-65  0.16  0.11
Share HH men 16-25  0.07  0.11
Share HH men 26-65  0.17  0.10
Number of HH members  6.38  2.56
Head is male  0.88  0.32
Head is indigenous  0.12  0.33
Mother's age  29.24  6.77
Mother's height (cm)  150.33  5.67
Mother's educ - primary  0.36  0.48
Mother's educ - secondary  0.39  0.49
Mother's educ - post sec.  0.16  0.37
Father's educ - primary  0.30  0.46
Father's educ - secondary  0.44  0.50
Father's educ - post sec.  0.20  0.40
House floor dirt dummy  0.51  0.50
Piped drinking water dummy  0.55  0.50
Flush toilet dummy  0.40  0.49
Urban dummy  0.68  0.47
Number of observations  19,053
The effect of VL expenditures  is insignificant in the basic OLS model (Table  14,
model 1). Moreover, it is negative in the IV models without district fixed effects (3 and 5).
27Although this effect is statistically significant in model 5, and almost significant in model 3,
the parameter estimates are substantively small. When district fixed effects  are included (2
and 6), the program effect becomes negligible and statistically insignificant.  The result is
similar when province-level  fixed effects models are estimated (4 and 7).  Thus, we find no
evidence that expenditures on the VL program have a direct positive impact on the nutritional
outcomes of young children-the  group to whom the program is directed-using either the
preferred approach (controlling  for the initial conditions in communities with district fixed
effects), or other models.
In both sets of IV models, the identifying instrument (FONCODES index of unmet
needs) is significantly correlated with per capita VL district expenditures.  Although the first-
stage parameter estimate for the FONCODES index is negative for 1996 in the basic IV
models (3 and 5), it is positive and strongly significant in the fixed effects models. While this
confirms that the instrument is valid in terms of its correlation with VL expenditures, it also
implies that marginal program targeting is propoor (Lanjouw and Ravallion  1999). In other
words, the positive parameter estimates for the instruments  suggests that the incidence  of
inframarginal VL spending benefits those districts with higher FONCODES indices (i.e., the
poor benefit more from marginal increases in program spending that may not be distributed
homogeneously  across all districts).
The remaining characteristics of the model are similar across estimation methods.
With regard to characteristics of the child, we find first that the gender variable is negative,
implying that boys have worse nutrition, holding household characteristics  constant. 11
Second, as expected, children who are from multiple births show significant reduced linear
growth. This effect of being a twin (or triplet) results in stunted growth that is approximately
0.45 standard deviations below the average.  Third, the increasingly negative and significant
effects associated with the birth order dummy variables  indicate that as the birth order
increases, children have lower height-for-age  z-scores.  This may be due to parity effects,
however, these dummies may be picking up intrahousehold effects, whereby there is less
investment in younger siblings. Fourth, we find a pattern, as illustrated by the dummy
variables for the age of the child, where stunting worsens as the child gets older up to the age
of the left-out category.  This is attributable to the cumulative effect of periods of nutritional
and health stress leading to a continued deterioration  in growth relative to age and gender
standardized norms, though there are some signs of catch-up or leveling off after the weaning
age (24 months). 12
11  We note that this differs from Ruggeri Laderchi's (2001) finding of no statistical effect using the  1997
ENNIV data.
12 Sahn and Stifel (2002) find that when errors in the measurement techique are not accounted for, the post
weaning-period  catch up tends to be underestimated.
28Table 14: Quasi-Reduced  Form Models  of HAZ (Age  0-159 Months)
Peru  DHS 1996 & 2000
OLS  Time varying  IV equation
Fixed  effects  Fixed effects
Basic Model (1)  District (2)  Basic Model (3)  Province  (4)
HAZ  Coeff:  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff:  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat
Per Capita VL District Expenditures  0.0001  0.05  -0.0010  -0.42  -0.0060  -1.64  -0.0007  -0.28
Asset Index  0.302  8.08**  0.156  4.46**  0.291  7.53**  0.158  4.46**
Male dummy  -0.083  -4.25 **  -0.075  -3.97 **  -0.082  -4.22 **  -0.080  -4.23 **
Multiple birth dummy  -0.431  -4.26 **  -0.468  -4.95 **  -0.440  -4.35 **  -0.469  -5.01 **
Birth order -- 2nd Child  -0.069  -2.06*  -0.062  -1.87+  -0.068  -2.05 *  -0.067  -2.02*
Birth order -- 3rd Child  -0.160  -4.00**  -0.140  -3.53**  -0.161  -4.01**  -0.151  -3.83**
Birth order -- 4th Child  -0.267  -5.42 **  -0.252  -5.21 **  -0.270  -5.47 **  -0.263  -5.50 **
Birth order -- 5th Child  -0.376  -5.89 **  -0.330  -5.36 **  -0.378  -5.91 **  -0.348  -5.63 **
Birth order-- 6th+ Child  -0.425  -6.61  **  -0.358  -5.72 **  -0.430  -6.69 **  -0.371  -5.95  **
Age 0-6 months  1.160  25.13**  1.137  24.43**  1.160  25.16**  1.142  24.77
Age 7-12 months  0.667  14.14 **  0.642  13.81 **  0.668  14.15 **  0.647  14.02
Age  13-18 months  0.153  3.35 **  0.142  3.20 **  0.152  3.34 **  0.148  3.31
Age 25-35  months  0.286  7.02 **  0.266  6.77 **  0.286  7.03 **  0.271  6.94
Age 36-59 months  0.053  1.50  0.044  1.27  0.052  1.48  0.045  1.33
Share HH members age 0-5  -0.540  -2.48 *  -0.542  -2.48 *  -0.544  -2.50 *  -0.535  -2.49
Share HH girls age 6-15  -0.198  -0.90  -0.177  -0.80  -0.191  -0.87  -0.150  -0.69
Share HH boys age 6-15  -0.268  -1.18  -0.264  -1.17  -0.273  -1.20  -0.249  -1.12
Share HH women 16-25  0.031  0.12  0.024  0.10  0.025  0.10  0.043  0.18
Share HH women 26-65  0.144  0.58  0.228  0.95  0.127  0.52  0.245  1.03
Share HH men 16-25  0.300  1.29  0.317  1.36  0.301  1.30  0.315  1.38
29Share HH men 26-65  0.433  1.84+  0.449  1.89+  0.440  1.87+  0.464  2.00*
Number of HH members  -0.030  -6.16 **  -0.025  -4.97 **  -0.030  -6.03 **  -0.025  -5.13 **
Head is male  -0.115  -2.99**  -0.090  -2.35*  -0.117  -3.05**  -0.090  -2.37*
Head is indigenous  -0.213  -4.36 **  -0.256  -4.63 **  -0.203  -4.11  **  -0.250  -4.81 **
Mother's age  0.062  3.69 **  0.055  3.30 **  0.063  3.74 **  0.056  3.43 *
Mother's age squared  -0.001  -2.60 **  -0.001  -2.41 *  -0.001  -2.63 **  -0.001  -2.47 *
Mother's height (cm)  0.054  22.79 **  0.051  22.54 **  0.054  22.79 **  0.052  22.98 **
Mother's educ -primary  0.018  0.35  -0.024  -0.49  0.024  0.47  -0.017  -0.36
Mother's educ - secondary  0.077  1.27  0.011  0.20  0.086  1.41  0.025  0.45
Mother's educ -post sec.  0.130  1.91 +  0.105  1.63  0.136  2.01*  0.120  1.90+
Father's educ -primary  -0.029  -0.61  0.005  0.11  -0.029  -0.62  0.007  0.14
Father's educ - secondary  0.112  2.47*  0.112  2.50*  0.111  2.46*  0.114  2.55 *
Father's educ - post sec.  0.084  1.64  0.127  2.50*  0.083  1.62  0.129  2.54 *
House floor dirt dummy  -0.029  -1.02  -0.064  -2.15 *  -0.033  -1.15  -0.063  -2.20 *
Piped drinking water dummy  -0.155  -4.34 **  -0.046  -1.24  -0.154  -4.31 **  -0.039  -1.09
Flush toilet dummy  0.031  0.75  0.055  1.36  0.046  1.06  0.050  1.25
Urban dummy  0.075  1.83 +  Fixed effect  0.064  1.55  Fixed effect
Constant  -10.122  -20.01 **  dummies omitted  -9.933  -19.57 **  dummies omitted
FONCODES index (t=0)  in IV equation  -0.098  -8.13**  0.218  48.17**
FONCODES index (t=l) in IV equation  0.239  11.95**  0.100  13.69**
FONCODES index in IV equation
Number of observations  19,053  19,053  19,053  19,053
R  1  0.300  0.356  0.301  0.342
Note: Instrument in IV models is district-level FONCODES index. All models were also estimated without household demographic variables.
The remaining estimates were not statistically, nor substantively affected.
** indicates significance  at 99 level of confidence,  ** at 95 level of confidence,  and + at 90 level of confidence.
30Table 14: (Continued)
Time dummy in IV equation
Fixed effects
Basic Model (5)  District  (6)  Province (7)
HAZ  Coeff:  t-stat  Coeff:  t-stat  Coeff:  t-stat
Per Capita VL District Expenditures  -0.0073  -1.97  * -0.0005  -0.21  -0.0003  -0.12
Asset Index  0.288  7.55  **  0.157  4.47  **  0.159  4.50  **
Male dummy  -0.082  -4.22  **  -0.075  -3.98  **  -0.080  -4.22  **
Multiple birth dummy  -0.442  -4.39  **  -0.468  -4.95  **  -0.469  -5.00  **
Birth order -- 2nd Child  -0.068  -2.04  *  -0.062  -1.87  +  -0.067  -2.02  *
Birth order -- 3rd Child  -0.161  -4.01  **  -0.140  -3.53  **  -0.151  -3.82  **
Birth order -- 4th Child  -0.270  -5.48  **  -0.252  -5.21  **  -0.263  -5.49  **
Birth order -- 5th Child  -0.379  -5.92  **  -0.330  -5.36  **  -0.348  -5.63  **
Birthorder--6th+Child  -0.431  -6.71  **  -0.357  -5.71  **  -0.371  -5.94  **
Age 0-6 months  1.160  25.15  **  1.137  24.43  **  1.142  24.77
Age 7-12 months  0.668  14.15 **  0.642  13.81  **  0.647  14.03
Age  13-18 months  0.152  3.34  **  0.142  3.20 **  0.148  3.31
Age 25-35 months  0.286  7.03  **  0.266  6.77 **  0.271  6.94
Age 36-59 months  0.052  1.47  0.044  1.27  0.045  1.33
Share HH members age 0-5  -0.544  -2.51  *  -0.540  -2.47  *  -0.533  -2.48
Share HH girls age 6-15  -0.190  -0.86  -0.177  -0.80  -0.150  -0.69
Share HH boys age 6-15  -0.274  -1.20  -0.263  -1.17  -0.248  -1.12
Share HH women  16-25  0.024  0.10  0.025  0.10  0.043  0.18
Share HH women 26-65  0.124  0.50  0.228  0.96  0.245  1.03
Share HH men 16-25  0.301  1.30  0.318  1.37  0.316  1.38
Share HH men 26-65  0.441  1.88  +  0.449  1.90  +  0.464  2.00
Number of HH members  -0.030  -6.02 **  -0.025  -4.97 **  -0.025  -5.12
Head is male  -0.117  -3.06 **  -0.090  -2.34  *  -0.090  -2.36
Head is indigenous  -0.201  -4.06 **  -0.256  -4.62  **  -0.250  -4.80
Mother's age  0.063  3.75  **  0.055  3.30  **  0.056  3.43
Mother's age squared  -0.001  -2.64 **  -0.001  -2.41  *  -0.001  -2.47
Mother's height (cm)  0.054  22.79  **  0.051  22.54  **  0.052  22.98
Mother's educ -primary  0.026  0.50  -0.024  -0.50  -0.017  -0.36
Mother's educ - secondary  0.087  1.44  0.011  0.19  0.025  0.44
Mother's educ -post sec.  0.137  2.03  *  0.104  1.61  0.120  1.89  +
Father's educ -primary  -0.029  -0.62  0.005  0.11  0.007  0.15
Father'seduc-secondary  0.111  2.46  *  0.112  2.51  *  0.114  2.56
Father's educ - post sec.  0.083  1.61  0.127  2.51  *  0.129  2.55
House floor dirt dummy  -0.034  -1.18  -0.064  -2.14  *  -0.063  -2.19
Piped drinking water dummy  -0.154  -4.31  **  -0.046  -1.25  -0.039  -1.10
Flush toilet dummy  0.049  1.14  0.055  1.35  0.050  1.25
Urban dummy  0.062  1.50  Fixed effect  Fixed effect
Constant  -9.892  -19.39  **  dummies omitted  dummies omitted
FONCODES  index (t=O) in IV equation
FONCODES  index (t=l) in IV equation
FONCODES index in IV equation  -0.018  -1.85  +  0.149  2.40  *  0.241  44.09
Number of observations  19,053  19,053  19,053
R'  0.301  0.356  0.341
Note: Instrument in IV models is district-level  FONCODES index.
** indicates significance at 99 level of confidence,  ** at 95 level of confidence,  and + at 90 level of  confidence.
31Turning to the household demographic variables, we find that larger households have a
negative and significant effect on child linear growth. This could follow from competition for
household resources at a given level of wealth. The positive and significant effect of the share of
men between the ages of 26 and 65 suggests that their contribution to income earnings outweighs
their competition for resources. On the other hand, the large negative and significant effect of the
share of members under the age of six likely implies competition for child nurturing resources.
Children living in male-headed households are found to suffer relative to those in female-
headed households. Recall that we control for household wealth, and as such this effect could
reflect preferences  of male household heads for consumption items that are not health/nutrition
related. Children living in indigenous (non-Spanish-speaking) households  are also found to be
disadvantaged.
We also consider the effects of a mother's characteristics  on nutritional outcomes.  The
increasing age of the mother contributes to better nutritional outcomes, although the negative
quadratic indicates diminishing positive effects of increase maternal age. 13 Since we have
controlled for birth order, it is likely that this age effect largely represents experience  in
household production activities (e.g.,  child nurturing). A mother's height also contributes
positively and significantly to increased heights of her children ceteris paribus either through her
genetic contribution or its expression in health or both.
Next we consider the effect of the education of mothers and fathers on the linear growth
of their children. In all of  the models, we find a positive and significant effect of father's
secondary education.  In the fixed effects models, we also find positive and significant effects of
father's post secondary education. Mother's secondary education has a positive and significant
effect on the nutritional outcomes of her children in the basic models and the province-level
fixed effects models. In none of the cases does primary education  alone (36 percent of mothers
and 30 percent of fathers) have an impact on nutritional outcomes.
Finally, in terms of the covariates that capture the child's proximate sanitary
environment, we find that dirt floors in the household have negative effects  on child growth
(fixed-effects models). We also find in the basic models that drinking water piped into the
household has a surprising negative effect on nutritional outcomes of children, though this is not
true of the availability of flush toilets where we find no effects. These results, however,  are not
consistent with other studies both for the general literature as well as for Peru (Alderman,
Hentschel, and Sabates 2003.).
13 The effect becomes negative at 63 years of age, well beyond the age of any mother in the sample of women
between the ages of 15 and 49.
326.  Conclusion
This paper evaluates the Vaso de Leche (VL) feeding program in Peru.  In doing so,  we
ask that if a community-based multi-stage targeting scheme such as that of the VL program is
progressive,  is it possible that the program can achieve its nutritional objectives?  This is done by
linking public expenditure data with household survey data to assess the targeting,  and then to
model the determinants of nutritional outcomes of children to see if VL program interventions
have an impact on nutrition.
We confirm that the VL program is reasonably well targeted to poor households and to
households with low nutritional status.  Despite official targeting criteria based not on income
status, rather on the presence of young children and pregnant and lactating women in the
household, approximately  50 percent of the poor received VL benefits, while less than 20 percent
of the non-poor were beneficiaries.  Further, in Probit estimates we find that households in the
poorest quintile of the population are 24 percent more likely than households in the richest
quintile to receive VL transfers.  In terms of the values of transfers,  over 60 percent (possibly up
to 75 percent) of the allocated VL budget goes to the poor.  Tobit models of the determinants of
household transfer values also indicate that the poor benefit more, as a one percent decrease in
the income level of a household corresponds  to a four percent  increase in the value of the VL
transfer, ceteris paribus. While this targeting is progressive, especially for one which is
commodity based, it is less so than other programs including the interministerial fund,
FONCOMUN  (Fondo de Compensacion Municipal).  At this time a cash transfer program is
being piloted in Peru.
The impact of food subsidies beyond their value as income transfers, however, is limited
by the degree to which the commodity transfers are infra-marginal.  Using the 2002 Public
Expenditure Tracking Survey, we find that transfers of milk and milk substitutes  from the VL
program are infra-marginal for approximately half of the households that receive them.  Thus, it
is not entirely surprising that we fail to find econometric evidence of the nutritional objectives of
the VL program being achieved.  In the models of child standardized  heights, we use VL
expenditures  to the community instead of household participation  as an explanatory variable,
solving the issue of endogenous household choice.  When we account for endogenous program
placement with fixed effects and instrumental variables models, we find no impact of the VL
program expenditures on the nutritional outcomes of young children - the group to whom the
program is targeted.
Thus, despite being reasonably well targeted to the intended beneficiaries  as well as to
the poor and malnourished, the VL program falls short of its primary objective to improve the
nutritional status of young children
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